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THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE PHILIPPINES-AS
FIXED BY THE RECENT DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE JURY TRIAL CASES.
The Supreme Court in the recent Philippine "jury trial" cases
laid down the rule that if territory has been legitimately and con-
stitutionally acquired by treaty, conquest, purchase or discovery,
while it remains unorganized territory of the United States,
Congress has power to adopt all appropriate and suitable means
for the proper government of such territory not prohibited by
the Constitution and not inconsistent with the fundamental and
essential principles of free government.
Not since Chief Justice Marshall decided the great cases in
which he enforced the famous doctrine of Implied Powers and
established the power of the judiciary to determine the validity
of an Act of Congress has there arisen a constitutional question
which so vitally affects the nation as the one presented by the
cases growing out of the administration of our Insular Possessions.
Indeed, it will be observed that there is a similarity bet*een the
principles laid down by Marshall and those recently declared by
the Supreme Court; the doctrine of Implied Powers in its last
analysis being, let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, then all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but are consistent with the spirit and letter of the Constitution,
are constitutional.
The judgment of the great Chief Justice which established
the power of the Supreme Court to declare an Act of Congress
null and void because inconsistent with the Constitution defined
the powers and marked the limitations of Congress in legislating
for the states, whilst the judgment of the court in the recent
Philippine cases defined the powers and marked the limitations
of Congress in legislating for the territories.
The question raised was not altogether new, but the upheaval
of the Spanish war brought it out in sharper and bolder outline
than it had formerly appeared. Hitherto the nation had been
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confronted with the administration of territory contiguous, for
the most part, to the states, and capable of being settled by
people schooled in the arts of self-government. Congress was
therefore able to extend substantially all the guaranties of the
Constitution to the newly-acquired territory almost from the
date of its acquisition. At the close of the Spanish war, how-
ever, we found ourselves in possession of islands lying in the
tropics, thousands of miles from our shores, and inhabited by
people totally ignorant of the duties and responsibilities of self-
government.
It was manifest from the beginning that all of the guaranties
of the Constitution could not be extended to these peoples, at
least for some time to come, and that, according to traditional
standards, they were and would for a long period be unfitted for
statehood. The cold fact was that we had come into possession
of territory unfitted for statehood which had to be administered
by governmental machinery unequipped for colonization.
Two questions arose: one of a purely political character to be
determined by the people-the other involving a proposition of
law to be determined by the Supreme Court. The general
public, who were interested mainly in the political aspect of the
matter, included in their considerations many questions of law.
And it is correct to say that the question of political expediency
obtruded itself upon the attention of the courts and the lawyers
in the consideration of the purely legal phase. Nor was this
strange.
It was a problem for the statesman as well as the jurist, as
was the case in the early days of the Republic, when Marshall
was called upon, through judicial interpretation, to give the Con-
stitution a meaning that would enable it to grow with the growth
of the country and to become adaptable to the manifold and ever-
changing needs of a young and progressive Republic.
The political question was, Shall we administer the islands,
which have fallen into our hands as a result of the war, or shall
we admit our incapacity to meet the situation, and turn them
over to some more capable, stouter-hearted nation? The people,
speaking through the administration, said, Having put our
hands to the plow, we will not turn back. We will meet the
responsibilities and execute the trust which the fortunes or fate
of war have committed to our hands.
The question of law with which the court had to deal, stated
in a simple and popular way, was, How shall Congress legislate
for these new and remote territories; as it does for the states,
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or appropriately-that is to say, in accordance with the needs,
customs and usages, of the people living in the territories?
Technically stated, the question was, Is Congress, in legislating
for these new possessions, bound by all the limitations and pro-
hibitions contained in the Constitution, which restrain it in leg-
islating for the states, or may it, in a measure, disregard these
limitations and extend to or withhold from the territories cer-
tain constitutional guaranties as it sees proper? The country-
like the court-was divided almost equally on the question.
The view that the Constitution attached with full force and
effect, with all the limitations contained in the Bill of Rights, to
the newly-acquired territory the moment the sovereignty of the
United States was extended over it, was supported by such
eminent jurists and constitutional lawyers as Mr. Justice
Harlan, Hon. J. C. Carlisle, Judge George F. Edmunds. They
held that Congress, in legislating for the islands, must be
restricted by the same limitations and prohibitions which apply
to it while it is legislating for the states. This position was
combatted by the friends of the administration and others,
who made a distinction between the United States proper and
the territory belonging to the United States; and contended that
there was no good reason why Congress, in legislating for the
territories, should extend to the people of the territories consti-
tutional guaranties which were unsuited to their wants; that
while Congress was always restrained by certain fundamental
principles upon which free government is founded, yet there
were certain other rules of government, not fundamental in
their nature, which Congress might extend to or withhold from
the territories as it sees proper; in short, that Congress, under
the Constitution. has the power to adopt a government for our
insular possessions which is appropriate and suitable to the
wants of the people, provided it is not inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of free government.
In the Philippine libel case the issue was squarely and
clearly raised. Fred L. Dorr and Edward F. O'Brien, owners
and editors of the Manila Freedom, were arrested and brought
to trial in Manila on the charge of criminal libel. They
demanded a jury trial. This was denied by both the trial court
and the Supreme Court of the islands. The case was appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States on the ground that
the ruling of the Philippine court was wrong because it violated
a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Under the Spanish
law, which was in force in the islands at the date of American
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occupation, all trials were conducted by judges. This law had
never been changed by military order or act of the commission,
and when Congress passed what is known as the "Philippine
Government Act" of July 2, 1902, it extended to the islands all
the guaranties contained in the Bill of Rights except the right
of trial by jury and the right to bear arms. The case presented
the question whether in the absence of a statute of Congress
expressly conferring the right, trial by jury is a necessary inci-
dent of judicial procedure in the Philippine Islands. The court
decided that the right to acquire territory carries with it the
power and obligation to govern it; and that Congress while
acting under Article 4, Section 3, of the Constitution, which
gives it power to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory of the United States, is not
bound to extend the right of trial by jury to such territory as
the Philippine Islands. It also held that the Constitution does
not of its own force and without legislation carry such right to
territory so situated. The court has held in other cases that
the Philippine Islands are territory belonging to the United
States. Mr. Justice Day in delivering the opinion of the court
reasoned that:
"If the right to trial by jury were a fundamental right which
goes wherever the jurisdiction of the United States extends, or
if Congress, in framing laws for outlying territory belonging
to the United States, was obliged to establish that system by
affirmative legislation, it would follow that, no matter what the
needs or capacities of the people, trial by jury, and in no other
way, must be forthwith established, although the result may be
to work injustice and provoke disturbances rather than to aid
the orderly administration of justice. If the United States,
impelled by its duty or advantage, shall acquire territory
peopled by savages, and of which it may dispose or not hold for
ultimate admission to statehood, if this doctrine is sound, it
must establish there the trial by jury. To state such a proposi-
tion demonstrates the impossibility of carrying it into practice.
Again, if the United States shall acquire by treaty the cession
of territory having an established system of jurisprudence,
where jury trials are unknown, but a method of fair and orderly
trial prevails under an acceptable and long-established code.
the preference of the people must be disregarded, their estab-
lished customs ignored and they themselves coerced to accept,
in advance of incorporation into the United States, a system of
trial unknown to them and unsuited to their needs. We do not
think it was intended, in giving power to Congress, to make
regulations for the territories, to hamper its exercise with this
condition."
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It will be observed that there was but a single constitu-
tional point determined by the court in these cases, viz., the
question of the right of trial by jury. But the decision of the
court has a meaning far beyond the simple determination of
this special question. The significant feature of the decision
of the court in these and in the other Insular Cases is the prin-
ciple or rule of interpretation invoked which lies at the founda-
tion of the judgment of the court. In order to get at the principle
underlying the decisions, it is necessary to make clear discrim-
inations upon two important points:
First, in regard to the two kinds of territory which make up
what Chief Justice Marshall called the "American Empire;"
and
Second, with reference to the different character of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.
These discriminations may be found in the opinions of the
court, but the latter and more important one has not in terms
been laid down as the basis of a rule of constitutional interpre-
tation. The distinction between the states which constitute the
Union and the territories outside of the Union which belong to
the government is easily made and is one found in the Constitu-
tion itself. The Constitution provides in Article 4 that terri-
tories as such shall be governed by Congress and before they
become states they must be admitted by Congress into the
Union. This act is attended with a solemn ceremony of far-
reaching consequence which changes entirely the legal status of
the territory. Laws of a local character cease to operate and
the Constitution in its entirety becomes the fundamental law of
the land. An indissoluble contract is entered into; an
indestructible yoke is imposed.
Whilst this discrimination is clear and easily made, to dis-
criminate between the two classes of rights guaranteed by the
Constitution is attended with much greater difficulty.
It was contended, on the one hand, that all the limitations on
congressional action contained in the Constitution are fundamen-
tal, while the extreme advocates of the other view held that none
of them are of such fundamental character that Congress might
not transcend them in legislating for the territories. The one
side contended that Congress must legislate for the territories
just as it legislates for the United States, whilst the other asserted
that it might operate in the territories with an absolutely free
hand. The rule lies between the extreme limits of the foregoing
views. There are undoubtedly some limitations which are not
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fundamental, and it is equally true that there are others which
are, and which Congress cannot violate without subverting the
very foundations of the Government; so that the true meaning of
the finding of the court in the Insular Cases-that is to say, the
principle of constitutional construction upon which the decision
must rest-is this: that there are certain prohiMitions and restrictions
contained in the Constitution relating to fundamental rights which go to
the very root of the power of Congress to act at all, in all Places, at all
times, and under all circumstances, in the territories as well as in the
states. On the other hand, there are other constitutional limitations, not
absolute in their nature, which relate to such matters as methods of pro-
cedure and forms of judicial trials that do not restrict Congress in the
exercise of its power to create local governments and make needful rules
and regulations respecting the territories of the United States.
I think the rule as above stated is a fair deduction from the
decision of the court in all of the insular cases and contains the
true philosophy contained therein, but its formation as such and
its final adoption as a rule of constitutional interpretation is
reserved for the future.
This being the vital point in the case the question naturally
arises, What limitations are fundamental, and what are not
fundamental? I shall undertake to answer this question gen-
erally and particularly. Generally speaking, those guaranties
are fundamental which are essential to the very existence of
free government. Those expressed and implied restrictions
relating to individual rights without which our form of govern-
ment could not exist, and which are respected by all modern
governments worthy of the name are undoubtedly fundamental.
The genius, nature and spirit of free government forbid the
violation of such rights at all times, in all places, and under all
circumstances, and hence those restrictions relating to them go
to the very competency of Congress to act at all. Such rights
are guaranteed by the Constitution itself, and the first eight
amendments. I would go farther, and say that the general
principles of law, reason and justice would guarantee these
rights to the people independent of their existence in the
amendments of the Constitution known as the "Bill of Rights."
If the government, or any branch of it, should undertake to
violate these rights it would subvert the principles on which it
is based.
The artificial or remedial rights are those which relate to
methods and forms'of judicial trial and modes of taxation, the
extension of suffrage, etc., which can be varied with the needs
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of the people without withholding from them those elemental
rights, the enjoyment of which is the essence of free gov-
ernment.
To descend to particulars, I should say, by way of illustra-
tion, that the following are fundamental restrictions on congres-
sional action:
(a) A person shall not be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law-(a person shall not be condemned
before he is heard).
(b) Private property shall not be taken for public use with-
out just compensation.(c) A person shall worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience.(d) Freedom of speech or the press shall not be abridged.(e) No bill of attainder or exlpostfacto law shall be passed.(f) No title of nobility shall be granted by the United
States. etc.
(g) No law shall be passed impairing the obligation of con-
tract.
I should say, on the other hand, that the following limita-
tions are not fundamental, and hence are not binding upon Con-
gress in legislating for the territories of the United States:
(a) In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a trial by an impartial jury (he may be tried by a judge
and no natural right be violated).
(b) The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not
be infringed.
(c) The right to suffrage.(d) All duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the Unitbd States.(e) No person shall be held to answer for a capital or other-
wise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment by
a grand jury.
If I am correct in the foregoing analysis, if the rule as above
indicated is the true basis of the finding of the court, the task
of the court in passing upon such cases in the future will be to
determine what are the natural and what are the artificial rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.
In this connection I desire to call attention to the distinction
which the court makes between organized and unorganized
territory of the United States. The court says in the Insular
Cases that territory to which the provisions of the Constitution
have been extended by Congress is organized territory, which
has been incorporated into the United States, whilst the newly-
acquired territory to which the Constitution has not been
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extended is known as unorganized territory of the United States.
Following this distinction, the court says that when once the
provisions of the Constitution have been extended to the terri-
tory by Congress they cannot be withdrawn. I confess that
these propositions do not commend themselves to my judgment.
In the first place, the organization of a territory belonging to
the United States by extending the provisions of the Constitu-
tion to it is one of degree, merely. For example, an act of
Congress has been passed providing for the government of the
Philippine Archipelago in which all the guaranties of the Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights have been extended to the
islands, except two. The question naturally arises, Are the
Philippines. under the ruling of the court, organized or unor-
ganized territory of the United States? According to the test
they are not yet organized territory, but, as a matter of fact,
they are ruled by governmental machinery which Congress has
created, and are certainly in a degree organized. The proposi-
tion that when the provisions of the Constitution have been
once extended to the territories by Congress, they .cannot be
withdrawn, seems to us to lack the support of sound reasoning.
If Congress has the power to withhold a constitutional guaranty
from the territories, it certainly has the power to withdraw
such guaranty if it be found to be inapplicable and not calcu-
lated to subserve the best interest of the people. The power
to withhold or extend implies the power to withdraw.
I shall now consider briefly the effect of these decisions upon
the growth and development of the country. It will be ob-
served that no time has been devoted to the discussion of the
sources of the power of Congress for governing the territories.
I deem this unnecessary. It may be derived from either of two
sources: First, the power may come from the Constitution
itself, which empowers Congress "to make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States"; or, second, the right to govern
may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire terri-
tory. The moment sovereignty -extends over a territory the
obligation is imposed irrespective of constitutional provisions to
administer that territory. Whichever may be the source
whence the power is derived, the possession of it is unques-
tioned.
It is curious and interesting to note the opinions of the
framers of the Constitution on this phase of the work at the
time the Constitution was adopted. Governeur Morris, for
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example, who framed the clause relating to the government of
the territories by Congress, in writing to a friend, used the fol-
lowing language:
"I always thought that when we should acquire Canada and
Louisiana it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and
allow them no voice in our councils. In wording the third sec-
tion of the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would
permit to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add
my belief that had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong
opposition would have been made . ..
"I knew as well then, as I do now, that all North America
must at length be annexed to us. Happy indeed if the lust of
dominion stop there. It would, therefore, have been perfectly
Eutopian to oppose a paper restriction to the violence of popu.
lar sentiment in a popular government. "*
A casual analysis of these decisions, in the light of the char
acter of our people and of the position our country now holds
among the nations of the world, produces the conviction that
the principle here enforced is bound to play a large part in the
development of the nation. If the view of the minority of the
court had prevailed, it would have been tantamount to saying
that this government shall not go to wat because it would be
unable, by reason of its structure, to meet the obligations that
may result from war. When nations go to war, as all are likely
to do some time in their history, they are likely to either cede
or acquire territory. Hitherto the results of our wars have
been the acquisition of territory.
If an interpretation is given to the Constitution which will
result in tying the hands of Congress in the administration of
newly-acquired territory, it amounts to saying to the United
States: You must not take territory that cannot be inhabited
by our own people, and cannot be ultimately incorporated into
the Union as a state. This is all very well as a general national
policy, but to prescribe it as a rule of law would have the effect
of rendering the government impotent in the case of an emer-
gency by denying it one of the attributes of sovereignty and by
circumscribing the treaty-making power. When a nation goes
to war it must be prepared to meet the emergencies and
responsibilities which result from war. Such things cannot be
forecasted. In the case of our late war with Spain the unex-
pected happened. No one dreamed of our taking the Philippines
when our war was declared. They came to us as the result of
* 3 Spark's Life of Morris, pp. 185-192.
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the destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay; and after
the ratification of the treaty ceding them to the United States it
became our duty to administer them. According to the decision
of the courts in the Insular Cases, we are enabled to administer
them appropriately, and thereby fulfill our obligations to our-
selves and to the Philippine people.
The hand of our government is now in the Orient and has
been for a number of years. Whilst we stand for justice, fair
play and peace among the nations, no one can foretell where
ihis policy may ultimately lead us. It is possible, though
improbable, that it may in time lead to war, and in such an
event we might be forced to acquire territory in Asia. This
acquisition would involve the obligation to administer such
territory. Would it be wise to place a construction upon the
Constitution which wodld practically preclude us from meeting
such an obligation if it should arise? I do not believe that
those who made the Constitution meant to hamper or restrict
the nation in meeting -its obligations and responsibilities as
such. The limitations contained in the first ten amendments
to the Constitution were designed for the protection of the
people of the states alone. The amendments to the Constitu-
tion contain a clear distinction between the United States
proper and territory under the jurisdiction of the United States. The
first ten amendments refer only to the United States, and were
intended to apply to the federal government for the purpose of
preventing encroachments upon the rights of the people of the
states, whilst the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments apply,
in terms, to the territories, and persons within the United
States, and to places and persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.
I would not be understood as favoring as a national policy
the acquisition of territory beyond the seas. I am opposed to
such a policy. On the other hand, I can find nothing in the
Constitution itself, or in the decisions of the Supreme Court; or
in the nature, spirit or history of our institutions which war-
rants an interpretation that would hamper us in meeting emer-
gencies as they arise.
The Declaration of Independence opens with the statement
that, "In the course of human events it has become necessary
for us to assume among the powers of the earth the separate
and equal station to which the laws of nature entitle us," and
concludes with the statement, "As free and independent States
they (the United States of America) shall have power to levy
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war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce,
and to do all other acts and things whick independent states may of
right do."
The Constitution of the United States confers absolutely
upon the government of the Union the power of making war
and of making treaties, and the power of acquiring territory,
either by conquest or treaty. The decisions of the Supreme
Court from the days of Chief Justice Marshall to the present
time leave no room for doubt that, under the Constitution, the
government of the United States, by virtue of its sovereignty,
has the full right to acquire territory enjoyed by every other
sovereign nation.
It is clear that when our forefathers threw off their alle-
giance to Great Britain and established a republican govern-
ment, they meant to call into being a nation endowed with
those powers to acquire and govern territory which all inde-
pendent governments, by virtue of their sovereignty, enjoy.
In the light of these facts, it is not strange or unreasonable
that the Supreme Court should declare that the Philippine
Archipelago, being territory belonging to the United States,
legitimately acquired, may be governed by Congress with a
view to the needs, usages, customs and conditions of the inhabi-
tants of such territory, and to that end may be adopted all
appropriate means not in violation of those natural and funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which form the
basis of all free government.
Lebbeus R. Wilfley.
